The Politburo Diktat

I'm not convinced that this last round of voting in Lebanon signals a newfound blossoming of democracy nor greater future security in Lebanon. The anti-Syrian opposition bloc that is claiming victory may have in fact assembled a very thin majority, but as the Times piece notes, the opposition has little chance of removing Syrian-backed president Emile Lahoud. The withdrawal of Syrian troops, a seeming victory for U.S. interests in the region, has actually increased existing religious, ethnic, tribal, and class tensions that are deeply embedded in Lebanese society. Furthermore, in terms of U.S. interests, any opposition-led block not large enough to remove Lahoud is a tenuous one at best.

Both arguments you cite are flawed and sound made for cable TV rather than true policy dialogue. First off, very few serious commentators on the left or right would argue that the current election cycle in Lebanon is unimportant. As for the second argument, that U.S. actions in Iraq are at least partially responsible for the current outcomes in Lebanon, there is a measure of truth, but it is much more nuanced than your position allows. The evidence you use to make this latter argument is that the decision-making of both the Libyan and Syrian presidents has been altered due to events in Iraq.

In Libya, the seeds of change were planted even before September 2001. High-level talks between American, European, and Libyan diplomats had begun in earnest in March of that same year. The Italian Foreign Minister even made an official visit to Tripoli in early 2002. Libya was not branded a member of the dubious Axis of Evil by President Bush and had no legitimate fear of an Iraqi style invasion. President Ghaddafi even cooperated with American investigations into the dealings of rogue Pakistani scientist AQ Khan. Rather, what propelled the final decision of Libya to embrace normalized relations with the West was the prospect of business investment that could be used to cement the legacy of Ghaddafi himself. Arguably, the soft negotiations employed by France, Britain, and Germany with Libya had much more to do with the changes in Libya's external relations with the West than the projection of American force in Iraq.

In my opinion, though, using Libya to claim similar success in Lebanon is fallous. There has been no internal reform within Libya and very little criticism from the U.S. administration over this fact. Not that the administration doesn't have an interest in liberalizing the near-feudal political institutions of Tripoli, but at the moment, the expansion of American business investment trumps the need for political reform. Stability is much more desirable for investors than a messy political process such as that in Iraq.

The second piece of evidence you use to make your case is that President Assad of Syria has somehow been kowtowed into submission is simply wrong and is not supported. You cite a three-word quotation from Assad which taken out of context is completely devoid of all meaning. Again, it sounds more like a quip made for cable TV rather than the basis of serious policy discussion. That aside, however, the situation in Iraq is clearly influencing events in Syria -- and not necessarily for the positive if you hold democracy as the end goal. The Economist notes in its most recent issue that President Assad's grip on power "may be growing stronger." As evidence it cites that fact that the surprisingly large Syrian miidle-class is "wary of the messiness of their similarly sectarian neighbours, Iraq and Lebanon." The piece goes on to say that President Assad is as popular as ever and that many Syrians are unwilling to embrace change if it means suffering the high costs associated with change in Iraq.

We hear little of these regional sentiments in the U.S. media, but they directly challenge the argument that democratic reforms in the region are spreading because of a groundswell of support from ordinary Arabs. And as with Libya, internal political processes have not begun to change in Syria. Over the next year or so we will begin to see the economic fallout of the Syrian troop withdrawal for Syria. (The redeployment of troops to the Syrian side of the border has slowed the movement of both goods and labor between the two countries.) If Syrian living standards slide more than they have over the past 40 years it could weaken the Assad regime. Perhaps this is the grand vision of the current U.S. administration, but it isn't likely to happen anytime soon.

I am going to have to start paying you for all these great referals!

If great minds think alike, what's up with us???