New Developments in Iraq

U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies

With the four-month-old increase in American troops showing only modest success in curbing insurgent attacks, American commanders are turning to another strategy that they acknowledge is fraught with risk: arming Sunni Arab groups that have promised to fight militants linked with Al Qaeda who have been their allies in the past.

American commanders say they have successfully tested the strategy in Anbar Province west of Baghdad and have held talks with Sunni groups in at least four areas of central and north-central Iraq where the insurgency has been strong. In some cases, the American commanders say, the Sunni groups are suspected of involvement in past attacks on American troops or of having links to such groups. Some of these groups, they say, have been provided, usually through Iraqi military units allied with the Americans, with arms, ammunition, cash, fuel and supplies.

American officers who have engaged in what they call outreach to the Sunni groups say many of them have had past links to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia but grew disillusioned with the Islamic militants’ extremist tactics, particularly suicide bombings that have killed thousands of Iraqi civilians. In exchange for American backing, these officials say, the Sunni groups have agreed to fight Al Qaeda and halt attacks on American units. Commanders who have undertaken these negotiations say that in some cases, Sunni groups have agreed to alert American troops to the location of roadside bombs and other lethal booby traps.

This is getting rather dicey. I’d like to view it as good news, but getting involved in a many-sided civil war (or “extreme ethnic/sectarian violence,” if you prefer) arming some guys today, taking sides with some other guys next week, telling everyone to be nice, and (importantly) not really being able to tell the sides apart, strikes me as a bad idea.

If there is a central government, whether it is relatively strong or weak, commanding the allegiance of more or fewer people, but it is, at least, a defined entity, and it is fighting against some kind of opponent (terrorists, guerrillas, insurgents, whatever), then that would be a conflict that we could understand and prevail.

This business of arming various groups, with the plan or hope that they then go along with our view for the country … makes me a little uncomfortable.

The fourth paragraph of the article puts it better:

But critics of the strategy, including some American officers, say it could amount to the Americans’ arming both sides in a future civil war. The United States has spent more than $15 billion in building up Iraq’s army and police force, whose manpower of 350,000 is heavily Shiite. With an American troop drawdown increasingly likely in the next year, and little sign of a political accommodation between Shiite and Sunni politicians in Baghdad, the critics say, there is a risk that any weapons given to Sunni groups will eventually be used against Shiites. There is also the possibility the weapons could be used against the Americans themselves.

Allahpundit has more on this. He’s as optimistic as possible, but also a little skeptical.

Comments

  1. Dreggas wrote:

    So we stopped arming Shia’s once the Shia started getting uppity and getting weapons from Iran, now we arm the Sunni so they can fight Al Qaeda which is made up of Sunni’s. Of course once they are done doing that they’ll be turning the weapons on the Shia.

    I believe this is becoming a textbook S.N.A.F.U that has the added benefit of being completely F.U.B.A.R.

  2. commissar wrote:

    I don’t know, Dreggas, I sincerely don’t know.

    If we could get to some kind of stability in Iraq, or low-level violence, or de facto division, or some balance between competing interests, and we could sit on that and enforce it indefinitely, with, say 30,000 soldiers (and ~ 10-20 killed per month) … I’d call that a pretty good result, compared to where we are now.

  3. Dreggas wrote:

    Commie,

    If recent history proves anything though, AQ is just a distraction for these Sunni. They have a beef with AQ, a bigger beef with us and an even bigger beef with the Shia. The only thing we have going for us is that, for the moment, the Sunni are distracted in going after AQ.

    I was watching the Iraq War diaries over the weekend and they were documenting a company of Marines stationed in Al Anbar. The one thing they kept saying was that basically, they didn’t know who the enemy was. They’d think a guy was a friend then boom he’s an insurgent.

    They also were saying that the only reason they were getting help from the Iraqi’s was in cases where a family member died due to AQ or the insurents, otherwise the Iraqi’s were perfectly content to shoot at em.

    A piss poor situation to be in to say the least.

  4. Bill from INDC wrote:

    So we stopped arming Shia’s once the Shia started getting uppity and getting weapons from Iran

    This is oddly overly-general history. How do you classify “the Shias” as a monolothic group that Americans “armed” but stopped when they got “uppity?”

    I mean, where does this narrative come from, specifically? You think we armed the Mahdi Army? The Iraqi security forces are predomonantly Shia, but are also Sunni, Christian, etc. And we are still arming them.

    Regarding Commissar’s assessment:

    It’s largely correct, as this news is equivocal. In the short-term it’s great news, as we’re establishing relationships with nationalist insurgents. In Iraq, relationships are a big deal.

    That said, these guys gravitate towards fighting, so once AQ is toast, they could very well go back to fighting Americans and the American-associated security forces.

    But that’s not a lock.

    Bottom line: this is a necessary gamble that could backfire. When and if the sunni insurgents fight us again in 6 months, those clucking their tongues at us arming them won’t be somehow proven wise … as these events are a necessary COIN gambit.

  5. Dreggas wrote:

    This is oddly overly-general history. How do you classify “the Shias” as a monolothic group that Americans “armed” but stopped when they got “uppity?”

    I mean, where does this narrative come from, specifically? You think we armed the Mahdi Army? The Iraqi security forces are predomonantly Shia, but are also Sunni, Christian, etc. And we are still arming them.

    We armed the ISF, the ISF is compromised due to infiltration of Shiite militiamen. As for the make up of the ISF I would almost be willing to bet it’s nearly all Shiite at this point. That’s one of the reasons the Sunni are working to take out AQ themselves, they don’t trust the ISF or any government force given that the government forces as they stand now are nearly all Shia.

    This was another interesting tidbit of the show I mentioned above in Iraq, the Sunni in Al Anbar would cooperate with Americans and talk to Americans but refused to talk to the contingents of ISF that came with the Americans because of the fact that ISF forces were Shia.

  6. Dreggas wrote:

    But that’s not a lock.

    I would argue that it is because even if they hate the Shia and hate AQ they hate being occupied just as much and they see us as occupiers.

    We thought the Shiites would be our best friends too…

  7. commissar wrote:

    Bill,

    “necessary gamble”

    Sounds right. There is nothing inherently wrong with allying oneself with the lesser of two evils, as we did in WW2.

    So let’s make it a political question. Fast-forward 20 months. Let’s say new Dem President Clint-Oba-wards is confronted with the kind of messy near-stability and low casualties I suggest. I.e. this idea is working about as well as we might reasonably expect.

    What will he/she do?

  8. Bill from INDC wrote:

    We armed the ISF, the ISF is compromised due to infiltration of Shiite militiamen. As for the make up of the ISF I would almost be willing to bet it’s nearly all Shiite at this point.

    You are incorrect.

    1. You say you were originally referring to the ISF, and we are still arming the ISF, so you’re statement that “we stopped arming Shia’s once the Shia started getting uppity and getting weapons from Iran” is obviously wrong.

    2. The ISF is not a monolithic Shia-dominated force by any stretch of the imagination (the article overgeneralizes). The ISF is comprised of IPs and IAs. The police are a local force, and thus are 100% Sunni in Sunni Anbar and 100% Shia in Basra, and mostly Shia in baghdad. The Iraqi Army is a national force, drawn from all over Iraq and stationed all over Iraq. Thus, it is comprised of a lot of Shiites, some Sunnis and a few Christians.

    The infiltration that you speak of is Baghdad and S Iraq. This does not represent all of Iraq, though it is a serious problem in the most significant area (Baghdad).

    Your narrative, however, is simple and factually incorrect in spots.

    Continued here:

    I would argue that it is because even if they hate the Shia and hate AQ they hate being occupied just as much and they see us as occupiers.

    We thought the Shiites would be our best friends too…

    Of course they hate being occupied. But the idea that we think they’ll be “our best friends” is just unserious hyperbole, far divorced enough from realistic counter-insurgency thinking that … well, that I should probably stop commenting, as I’m not sure I’ll convince you of much.

    Suffice it to say, working with nationalist insurgents is a requisite gambit to a. kill the more pressing enemy (al Qaeda) and potentially b. co-opt Sunni insurgents to establish relationships with the Americans and ISF and start backing the government model. it has nothing to do with making “best friends.” And it could backfire.

    That doesn’t mean it’s not the right move to make.

  9. Dreggas wrote:

    commissar wrote:
    What will he/she do?

    Hopefully not trumpet that “the surge is working”. Ok snark aside. I think if that strategy is working (and we haven’t done so by then) it would be high time to get the hell out of dodge. Of course that runs the risk of things going back to full scale civil war which, sadly, is most likely going to happen eventually.

    To me it’s like getting stuck in quicksand and finding one tiny bit of stability that allows you to get out. We keep sinking deeper and deeper now but if we find that one semi-solid (solid enough to use to build momentum) we’d take the opportunity to get out quickly.

  10. Bill from INDC wrote:

    Commissar -

    So let’s make it a political question. Fast-forward 20 months. Let’s say new Dem President Clint-Oba-wards is confronted with the kind of messy near-stability and low casualties I suggest. I.e. this idea is working about as well as we might reasonably expect.

    What will he/she do?

    That’s simple: reduce and rebrand.

    See Noah Feldman’s “The Undeparted.” It’s behind the NYT’s subscription wall now, but it’s an essential read. I’ll look for a reposted copy in full.

  11. Dreggas wrote:

    Of course they hate being occupied. But the idea that we think they’ll be “our best friends” is just unserious hyperbole, far divorced enough from realistic counter-insurgency thinking that … well, that I should probably stop commenting, as I’m not sure I’ll convince you of much.

    Suffice it to say, working with nationalist insurgents is a requisite gambit to a. kill the more pressing enemy (al Qaeda) and potentially b. co-opt Sunni insurgents to establish relationships with the Americans and ISF and start backing the government model. it has nothing to do with making “best friends.” And it could backfire.

    I don’t recall saying that we thought they’d be our best friends (if we do then we must still be in “flowers and candy” territory in which case we are severely screwed).

    It is a gamble, one we probably should not be taking for the simple fact it will most likely come back and bite us in the ass. It’s not something that is looking at the long term, it’s looking at short term which in this case is fighting Al Qaeda.

    If I remember the Sunni were all too happy to cheer on Al Qaeda when Al Qaeda (if they can be called that) were killing Shia and Americans, it’s only now that they are starting to turn on them in any major way.

    I’m not saying there is much in the way of an alternative, there is no easy way through any of this but the end result is pretty predictable.

  12. Dreggas wrote:

    Interesting thoughts here on this

  13. Grim wrote:

    It’s worth noting that the program comes with fingerprinting of our new allies. So, if they turn on us, we’ll have biometric data that will help us sort out just who is playing both sides.