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1. Chapomatic » Fight’s On on 29 May 2007 at 11:41 pm

   […] John, in about comment 93,753, echoes my sentiments about the substance, and Grim is trying to get some clue distributed in the comments; however, this is more of an occasion for sitting back and watching the […]

Comments

1. Pablo wrote:

   So, is the graph going to go the other way? Ever? How?

   How? Iraqis.

   That is and always has been the only realistic hope for Iraq.

   Iraqis.

   Posted 29 May 2007 at 2:19 pm ¶

2. commissar wrote:

   They just need some more time to build up those security forces, eh?

   Posted 29 May 2007 at 2:20 pm ¶

3. ZaMoose wrote:

   1) March 2003 is obviously a poor starting point, insurgency-wise. The US forces had just swept to Baghdad, the Iraqi Army had melted into the scenery and the entire situation was in too much flux for a “decent” insurgency to take hold. Most of the attacks that you see listed for 2003-mid-2004 are attributable to Stalinist hold-outs and dead-enders.

   2) The rise in attacks on ISF personnel is a bit of a false front. There effectively was no ISF shortly post-invasion and the ranks have only begun to swell in Sunni areas in the last 6-12 months. It’s hard to kill lots of what isn’t there. I would posit that the increase in absolute numbers of attacks on ISF personnel is in very near accord with the actual number of ISF personnel registered and fielded, although the numbers on that too-small graph you provided seem to indicate that ISF attack numbers are roughly flat — i.e., little change month-to-month as the numbers in the ISF go up. A table with the figures used to generate that graph would indeed be helpful.

   3) Al Qaeda and the Iranian-supplied insurgents have done very little to hide the fact that their primary strategy is one of swaying the media and thereby the American people to their side through horrific and “spectacular” attacks. Thus, they have concentrated their efforts on the areas where the most cameras are — in and around Baghdad. Did the NYT analysis that resulted in the graph you posted have any geographic correlation between the attack figures and the numbers themselves?

   In response to your overall point, however, I’d like to get a little Socratic and ask you a question, since you like to cite MNF-I sources:

   Against that background of violence, how do you feel about the increase of average power output from 4,300 megawatts to 4,8000? What of a per-capita GDP that has grown from $950 to nearly $1,800 since invasion? Cell phones, once non-existant in non-Ba’athist hands, now number close to 6.5 million, internet users have gone from 7,500 to over 200,000 (and that’s just monthly customers), a free press, radio and TV industry has sprung up where none existed before. The ISF has grown from ~90,000 in 2004 to over 265,000 now.

   I see peril and I see carnage, but I see those other things too. It is a shame you are letting al Q and the agenda-driven media drag you down into such depths of ill-humor and despair.

   Posted 29 May 2007 at 2:23 pm ¶

4. Grim wrote:

   Number of attacks per day is a bad metric. The reason for this is that attacks vary, not just in effectiveness, but in strength.

   In 2004 — a time on the graph where attacks were 2/3rds to 1/2 what they are later — insurgents under al Sadr were in control of as many as eleven cities, including the holy city of Najaf; they were engaged in daily war with the US Army involving main battle tanks. At the same time, AQI insurgents in Anbar were in full control of Fallujah, and attacked USMC strongholds in Ramadi so strongly that general officers were required to take up rifles to repel the enemy fighters.

   The insurgents may be fielding substantially more attacks now than in 2004, but they are substantially weaker attacks. We’re talking about not assaults on USMC bases, but snipers shooting a few rounds at a patrol; not insurgent armies holding the Shrine of Ali against the Coalition, but bombers in the suburbs of Baghdad sending a few bombs into the city and then scuttling out again.

   Kidnappings and bombings remain a serious problem, but — however much more frequent they may be — there is simply no argument that the insurgency groups are stronger now than in 2004. They are substantially weaker.

   Posted 29 May 2007 at 2:24 pm ¶

5. Pablo wrote:

   They just need some more time to build up those security forces, eh?

   Do you have a better idea, Stephen?

   Posted 29 May 2007 at 2:27 pm ¶

6. Grim wrote:

   On the same topic —

   I was on last week’s teleconference call with Colonel (and doctor of anthropology) David Kilcullen. He made the point that the new ‘gated community’ tactic in Baghdad, which was based on a tactic used successfully in northern Ireland, had reduced the number of civilian casualties by 5,000-8,000 during his tenure. His figure, he said, was derived by projecting casualties if the attacks had continued at the same level of success they were enjoying before the Surge and its new tactics, versus the number actually suffered.

   These communities (not really gated, but blocked off from each other by checkpoints and mobile barriers) may be suffering a similar number of attacks, but they are apparently suffering a greatly reduced number of casualties. Where before we were looking at death squads slipping across neighborhoods at night and killing whole families, now they have to pick off stragglers where they can.

   There was bad news in the call too, as you’ll see if you follow the link — but it’s fair to point up the good news as well. As Dr. Kilcullen said, the most important thing is having an honest and informed debate.

   Posted 29 May 2007 at 2:39 pm ¶

7. commissar wrote:

   ZaMoose,

   Electricity

   Brookings Institute data p. 39

   Pre-war megawatts - 3958

   May 2007 megawatts - 3735

   Do you have a source on your numbers?

   too much flux for a “decent” insurgency to take hold.

   My point is that our poor occupation provided the cause for the ‘decent insurgency.’ We planted it, watered it, and grew it.

   Posted 29 May 2007 at 2:41 pm ¶

8. commissar wrote:

   there is simply no argument that the insurgency groups are stronger now than in 2004. They are substantially weaker.

   C’mon, Grim, you have to take a wholly strained, rationalized view of the data. “Weaker” attacks? I know you’ve read about insurgent adapability (at least): shaped IEDs and better snipers.

   Their attacks are way up, by an order of magnitude. It’s too a big a stretch, it’s denialism to pretend otherwise.

   Posted 29 May 2007 at 2:46 pm ¶

9. ZaMoose wrote:

   Your WP install seems to have eaten my previous attempt to post a reply, so here goes again (and I note that you backtracked from calling me out by name — may I inquire as to why? Your permalink slug still has me in it. *grin*):

   I got my figures from the same source as the NYT graph you posted above, namely MNF-I, specifically the country facts portion of the website.

   Goose, gander, eh wot wot?

   Posted 29 May 2007 at 2:53 pm ¶

10. Grim wrote:

    Quite right. But both shaped charges and snipers are weaker than infantry tactics designed to overrun USMC headquarters’ positions — tactics that came close to success in Ramadi. They are weaker than the tactics that produced “no go” areas in Anbar throughout 2004.

    We’ll likely actually see increased casualties between now and September, as we move forces out of FOBs and into the JSS mentioned in the post on the teleconference. The idea is to get out there into the communities; that exposes you more to snipers, who are hard to control in an urban environment. Think how long it took to catch the DC “snipers,” whose riflemanship was actually piss-poor — they were taking shots within tens of yards, rather than hundreds; former Marine blogger Doc Russia can make a 500 yard shot on iron sights, and he wasn’t a Scout Sniper. They can hit quarters at a thousand yards.

    Nevertheless, though I anticipate heightened casualties among servicemen, I will assert that we’re seeing progress — if those JSS produce the drop in civilian casualties, and the subsequent stabilization of civil society, that they are designed to produce. Not, mind you, the number of attacks — the number of people wounded and killed, and the ability of people to live their lives with relative normality.

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 2:53 pm ¶

11. commissar wrote:

    Grim,

    I’ll acknowledge the good progress in Anbar.

    But overall, the trends I see are unfavorable. Civilian deaths are way, way up since the Samarra bombing in Feb 2006.

    The penetration of our base at Tarmiya and the attack on 8 guys a couple weeks ago, suggest to me that we’re constantly being compelled to stay in larger, better-defended groups.

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 3:07 pm ¶

12. commissar wrote:

    ZaMoose,

    That report is from April 2006.

    The highest number ever reported by Brookings is June 2006, with 4400.

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 3:18 pm ¶

13. Grim wrote:

    Yes, Dr. Kilcullen had the Samarra bombing as a point of reference also. He agrees with you that addressing that problem is of foremost importance, enough that it’s worth gambling the blood of our own fighting men to try and solve it. It’s a difficult problem, though again, he feels that we’re seeing some progress in the most recent history.

    That leads to another oddity of the ‘number of attacks’ metric — it doesn’t really allow us to monitor or judge the severity of attacks on civilians. In fact, if you had only this table to go by, you’d think that was a small part of the problem. In fact, it may be the main part of the problem. Insofar as we’re establishing criteria for judging whether or not there is progress, we need something that will represent severity as well as frequency of attacks, in the several categories.

    What kind of method can we agree would track that? We need a measure of effectiveness for the surge so we can see if it really is working, as it becomes fully staffed.

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 3:20 pm ¶

14. commissar wrote:

    Grim,

    Pardon my skepticism on this, but we both know what September will bring.

    A report of “mixed results” which will call for a continuation of the surge. Iraqi civilians casualties may be up or down somewhat. US military casualties will be up, but, of course, and with obvious legitimacy, that will be attributed to the Surge itself.

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 3:38 pm ¶

15. ZaMoose wrote:

    Commissar:
    Last I checked, your graph at the top of the page didn’t cite Brookings, it cited MNF-I. In a disagreement in terms between the two, I’m going to go with MNF-I over the left-leaning Brookings.

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 3:45 pm ¶

16. commissar wrote:

    Even though they gave up reporting on electricity since April 2006? I wonder why.

    The graph in the post is from the NYTimes. (But page 30 of Brookings shows what looks like the same graph.)

    The electricity data is from Brookings.

    You can trust or distrust whomever you like, but Brookings’ data on Iraq’s reconstruction is generally considered to be the best and to be impartial.

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 4:00 pm ¶

17. Grim wrote:

    Skepticism is one thing, commie; but cynicism is another. So let’s look for some measure of effectiveness that you’d accept, that we might reasonably expect to see if the surge’s claims are viable.

    You say that you accept the claims of progress in Anbar, so I gather you’re open to evidence if it’s strong enough. What would satisfy you that progress is both possible and actually happening, within the limits of what the surge claims it might be able to accomplish?

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 4:17 pm ¶

18. ZaMoose wrote:

    No megawatt figures since then, you’re correct, but they do report on electrical progress in the 25th Jan 2007 facts update. Large areas of the country had no reliable power pre-invasion. The country now averages 12-14 hours per day.

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 4:31 pm ¶

19. R.L.Page wrote:

    When the criterion for judging progress is a greater number of U.S. casualties, something is very wrong.

    I recall the Rumsfeld-Cheney musings that correlated more dead and wounded American soldiers with the “enemy’s” increasing “desperation.” That is, they were selling the delusion that the more there were losses on the American side, the more we were winning.

    These men are insane.

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 4:34 pm ¶

20. commissar wrote:

    Grim,

    Using the Brookings data, (which is tricky) it seems that in Baghdad, in the two months before the surge, there were 1400 civilian casualties a month (see page 9). Looking at page 19, in 2003 through early 2004, civilian casualties for ALL OF IRAQ were about 200 a month. By definition, the Baghdad numbers were less than that.

    With that as a frame, if the Surge brings Baghdad civilian casualties back down to 200 a month (still higher than in 2003, right?), then we’d call the Surge successful. And this assumes that violence and casualties haven’t simply been exported to other regions.

    within the limits of what the surge claims it might be able to accomplish?

    Huh? Do you mean that, for example, 200 a month might be infeasible, and therefore I have to specify a number that is feasible?

    We can talk about a number that represents reasonable stability in Baghdad, or we can talk about a number that General Petraeus might say is possible. But why even ask the first, if the answer must be constrained by the second?

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 4:45 pm ¶

21. Grim wrote:

    I mean only to ask for a benchmark by which we (you and I) can agree that progress is, in fact, being achieved. If the timeframe is September, what should the surge be able to accomplish in that time to be convincing?

    I admit that I doubt it will reduce civilian casualties in Baghdad by 6/7ths between now and September. I’d be delighted if it did; but I’d be surprised. I do think we’ll see a real reduction, though. The question I’m asking is, what level of reduction should we establish as necessary to declare that progress is both (a) possible, and (b) happening?

    Posted 29 May 2007 at 5:15 pm ¶

22. commissar wrote:

    Grim,

    Am I supposed to say 800 or 1000?

    I’d like to. Really.

    But such a number would not, to me, declare meaningful progress.

    It’s late; I’ll try to cough up a more thoughtful reply tomorrow.

    Posted 30 May 2007 at 12:06 am ¶