On killing 4,000 bad guys
Al Qaeda In Iraq: 4,000 Insurgents Dead
Good. Clearly better than 4,000 of our people getting killed. Outstanding military action. A great tactical success.
But what does my favorite “document of the month,” the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM3-24, say about killing a lot of the enemy?
1-133. Unsuccessful practices:
Place priority on killing and capturing the enemy, not on engaging the population.1-105. It is easier to cut an insurgency off and let it die than to kill every insurgent. Attempting to kill every insurgent is normally impossible. It can also be counterproductive, generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge. Dynamic insurgencies also replace losses quickly. A skillful counterinsurgent cuts off the sources of that recuperative power. Some can be reduced by redressing the social, political, and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency. Physical support can be cut off by population control or border security. International or local legal action might be required to limit financial support. As the host government increases its own legitimacy, the people begin to more actively assist it, eventually marginalizing and stigmatizing insurgents to the point where their legitimacy is destroyed. Victory is gained not when this isolation is achieved, but when it is permanently maintained by and with the active support of the populace.
1-131. Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing
When COL Harry Summers allegedly told a North Vietnamese counterpart in 1975 that “You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” the reply supposedly was, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.” Military actions by themselves cannot achieve success in COIN. Tactical actions must not only be linked to operational and strategic military objectives, but also to the essential political goals of COIN. Without those connections, lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain.
What’s more, the manual says nothing about the importance of media references to the enemy as “terrorists,” rather than “insurgents.” Someone get Mattis and Petraeus on the horn, and tell ‘em to make their field manual “fit in” better with Brewfan’s shibboleths.
Well, then … since just plain killing the insurgents isn’t what Mattis and Petraeus have in mind, what do they suppose to be the goal of the kind of war we’re in?
1-90. The primary objective of any counterinsurgent is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments described as “legitimate” rule primarily with the consent of the governed, while those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Their citizens obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. A government that derives its powers from the governed tends to be accepted by its citizens as legitimate. It still uses coercion — for example, against criminals — but the bulk of the population voluntarily accepts its governance.
1-97. Military action can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy. However, restoring legitimacy can only be accomplished using all instruments of national power. Without the host-nation government achieving legitimacy, COIN cannot succeed.
“Developing effective governance by a legitimate government?” WTF? I think we should just kill as many ragheads as possible. Then they’ll come around.
Seriously, the key sentence is “Military action can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy,” most notably security and stability. That requires a lot of troops.
Two reports from Haditha
Wuterich says rules were followed at Haditha
Terror at home
More Goldstein Obsession
Filed under “Boggles the Mind”