Iraq War Hurting U.S. Terror Fight?
Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Hurting U.S. Terror Fight
The war in Iraq has become a primary recruitment vehicle for violent Islamic extremists, motivating a new generation of potential terrorists around the world whose numbers may be increasing faster than the United States and its allies can reduce the threat, U.S. intelligence analysts have concluded.
A 30-page National Intelligence Estimate completed in April cites the “centrality” of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the insurgency that has followed, as the leading inspiration for new Islamic extremist networks and cells that are united by little more than an anti-Western agenda. It concludes that, rather than contributing to eventual victory in the global counterterrorism struggle, the situation in Iraq has worsened the U.S. position, according to officials familiar with the classified document.
This NIE report, first reported in the NYTimes, has been widely covered in the blogosphere, especially by the Leftie blogs, less so by conservative blogs.
In these discussions, the first thing to understand is what is happening and how it’s happening.
Michael Ware of TIME magazine described it this way for Frontline back in February:
[Iraq] is a magnet for any young man, who, like in Afghanistan, like Osama bin Laden himself in the ’80s, you want to serve the cause, you pack up, and you go. It’s the same with the money. If you want to give money for the jihad, then you want it to go where it’s needed most and where it’s sexiest. … And Iraq is the hot place to be. It’s the hot place to give your money, and if you want to serve anywhere in jihad, then this is the place to come. This is where you can fight the infidel, the great Satan himself, face to face.
Now, when you go home from your tour of duty, and you sit around the mosque or the teahouse, and you can say, “I was there; I fought in Iraq,” that silences a room. And what we’re now seeing is not only the physical building of this generation, [but] through the boundless promise that the Internet has offered the jihad world, there’s a whole generation that’s been inspired. Look how much has now been done in the name of Iraq and in retribution: from the London bombings to Bali and estranged involvement here in Iraq.
It’s re-enlivened the entire organization and the cause and the idea. [For Abu Musab] al- Zarqawi and his immediate organization, [and] more broadly [for] Al Qaeda, they are the main beneficiaries of this war. The very thing George Bush says he came here to prevent, he is actually fostering and giving life to. It has to be the greatest irony of this whole experience.
And I see it; I’ve touched it. I’ve sat with these people … under a dictator like Saddam, where there was no Al Qaeda; there were no camps like there were in Afghanistan; there were no training programs; there were no cells and safe houses. I have been to Al Qaeda camps, Al Qaeda communities; I’ve seen them training. I am now in possession of their training video, so eerily reminiscent of what we saw coming out of Afghanistan: foot soldiers going through obstacle courses, men in masks learning how to search houses, fire missiles, handle weapons, bombs, assassinations, drive-by shootings. We’re now seeing that happening here in Iraq. That is only happening as a result of the U.S. invasion and ongoing prison [problems]. This is going to be the great legacy of the war in Iraq.
To their credit, conservative bloggers Rick Moran and James Joyner dealt with the NIE report in thoughtful posts.
My friend Rick Moran responds to the NIE report as follows, emphasizing the futility of trying to address the so-called root causes:
I am resisting the implications that some would draw from it; that if only we had not confronted the jihadists or worked to solve the root causes of terrorism, none of this would be true today.
I totally reject that notion. In fact, I believe it delusional thinking to say that we’d be any safer if we hadn’t invaded Iraq or if we had just lobbed a few cruise missiles at Osama Bin Laden following 9/11, or even if we had put enormous pressure on Israel to come to an agreement with the Palestinians. All of this ignores the one overarching truth about the nature of our enemies (and their tens of millions of supporters around the world); what they seek, we cannot give them.
Yes, absent the war in Iraq, the “root causes” would still be there, because we are wealthy, because we support Israel, etc.. And the Arab street would be perpetually enraged, erupting in paroxysms of fury at every Danish cartoon, at every Papal quote, at every Zionist military action. But that’s a very different thing from what the NIE and Michael Ware describe: actual trained jihadis, men who have fought United States troops in the field, a reinforcing cycle of recruits and veterans. It’s a crucial distinction that we really cannot dismiss with “oh, they are always protesting something or other.” Widespread, but amorphous feelings of al-Jazeera-fueled rage are very very different from rapidly multiplying trained cells of guys who actually have fought us, have acquired the skills of the terrorist trade, and have the know-how and organization to fight us.
Rick also asks what if we had not confronted Saddam? And points to the possibilities of a “re-invigorated Iraq” and Saddam’s ties to terrorists. I agree with Rick that this is old ground and counterfactual. At the risk of entering a debating quagmire, I will point to the numbers, the strength, the hydra-headedness, and the resilience of global jihadist terrorism as it exists right now in 2006. Saddam’s intelligence service never developed any such organization. To suppose it could have is unrealistic. And, I’ll note that I am making an argument of the “deltas.” Since March 2003, the global jihadist movement has increased by X, which increase has resulted largely, if not wholly, from the Iraq war. To argue that we would have seen a comparable increase, resulting from a “reinvigorated” Saddamist regime, seems a somewhat arbitrary. He was never able to create such growth of terrorists from 1980 to 2003; there’s no reason to suspect his powers would have multiplied in the past three years.
I would also quibble with Rick’s title “Does confronting terrorism make it worse?” As an absolute rule, or even a general rule, I don’t know. But no one is arguing for a general rule here. The observation is specific. “Our actions in Iraq, between 2003-2006, have increased the recruiting of Islamic extremists.”
James Joyner also comments on the NIE report, and concludes with the policy question:
The question remains, however: What now? If the Iraq War has increased the number of terrorists, does it follow that leaving Iraq in its current state would decrease the number of terrorists? Doubtful.
While Osama and company managed to attact large numbers of troops to fight the atheist Soviets in Afghanistan, they gained far more out of the fact that the Soviets left Afghanistan in defeat. Similarly, it’s quite likely that an American withdrawal from Iraq without accomplishing the barest part of our mission–a reasonably stable, democratic society–would embolden the jihadists. Afghanistan. Lebanon. Somalia. Each of those displays of weakness convinced the jihadists that the infidel was weak and could be defeated. Forcing the Americans to leave Iraq would be a far, far bigger prize.
I take James’ point. Honestly, I am not sure. I can only note that two things are actually happening: America is actually taking casualties and al Qaeda is actually increasing. To perpetuate these trends because of what “might” happen is a dangerous game. A post-American Iraq could take many forms, probably none of them to our liking, but one might suppose al Sadr, al Sistani, and other nationalist Shiites would play at least as large a role as the Sunni jihadists. I’m not trying to predict any particular outcome, merely pointing out that James’ prediction of Iraq as “Jihadist Afghanistan Redux” also iisn’t a certainty.
There are two other glaring facts about Iraq that conservative bloggers tend to avoid. First, in Bush’s words before the war, a democratic and secure Iraq would enhance America’s security. Given that, how can one avoid the opposite: an Iraq degenerating into ever-increasing sectarian violence, “the war that dare not speak its name,” would harm our security. It is hard to imagine that an Iraq riven by hatred, strife, and bloodshed is somehow good for us, especially since we premised our invasion on a whollyy different outcome.
Second, the problem (remember, it’s an operational problem with recruits gaining actual combat experience) is a function of a war drawn out for over three years. If Iraq had been promptly secured, it if had been “cakewalk,” then there would be no war for these jihadists to volunteer for. A successful war, instead of a failed war, wouldn’t have been a problem.
Powder Line resorts to “the evil MSM misrepresented the report.” And adds an update that a White House spokesman also invokes the “not representative” defense. *sigh* It’s a parallel universe they are in, or something. If any reader of mine wants to believe that the jihadist movement is not stronger and more numerous, as a result of our actions in Iraq … I just don’t know what to say. “Go read Powder Line?”
In sum, it is harder and harder to avoid the obvious (dare I call it a “fact?”) — The war in Iraq has made things worse and is making things worse every day. Whether we originally supported the war or not, denial is not a foreign policy.
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