the first 80-100,000 for the locations you specified.

The second to split among the border of Iraq to help control the influx of arms from Syria & Iran the other half being used as a rotationary reserve to give at least 40-50,000 troops more down time

Thats my numbers and I’m sticking to it.

Heavy handed? Yes.

And your dead on in regards to the mission creep.

As far as Anbar goes, I happen to be researching that region for a side project, and I’ve been told that it’s not quite as bad (or much different from what it’s always been) as is depicted in the intelligence report or Ricks’ article about the report. The problems are mostly centered around Ramadi.

Finally - I think your highlight of the juxtaposition between Drum’s post and Kristol and Lowry’s non-specific demand is good (especially Drum’s point). So the next question is - asked as someone who was planning on trying to figure this out - where is the best analysis of US military force structure, outlining options and limitations of reassignment of troops to Iraq?

You know someone’s done it. Well. We need a look at the real options. Kristol and Lowry should have done that legwork prior to putting that argument in the WaPo.

1. A political calculation

2. Delusion

3. Because it’s impossible.

If its strictly point one, I’d think we’d see an uptick of deployment after November. If it’s 2, 3 or a combo of both, we aren’t fighting to win based on original criteria.

In a sense, it’s very important that Lowry and Kristol are making this argument, as they have the ear of those in the admin. But their refusal to use specifics diminishes the impact, as well as opening them up to suspicions of half-hearted ass-covering prior to a foreign policy failure.

At The Politburo Diktat there is a back of the envelope estimate of troop levels that might be needed in Iraq to achieve what we have been told i……

Lowry and Kristol take the approach towards troops–saying we need to dedicate more without having any idea where they’d come from–that conservatives used to bash liberals for when it came to spending tax dollars (of course, we’re in the Medicare D era now).

In World War II spending was over 43%

While I’m not endorsing we spend 40% on the military I am endorsing that our military is grossly underbudgeted for this type of operation.

Military spending is really 4.7%, which is still historically low/reasonable.

Think about the consequences of defining the mission in Iraq this way. Such a mission requires no other success in Iraq, beyond our troops being there, supplied and not driven out. As long as we can have some number of troops, sitting in tolerably secure bases, dodging IEDs, and moving around in armored columns, regardless of what else is happening (good or bad) in Iraq, then some could claim, “Aha, but we are holding the line against the mullahs in Iran.”

I did not get a sense of that at all from the relevant quote on Iran. Particularly when the sentence right after “Defeat will leave that same regime inestimably strengthened.” is “If there is any significant possibility that the presence of more American soldiers on the ground would raise the odds of success, not putting those soldiers on the ground is a crime.” This is quite at odds with the idea that we should just have troops in Iraq “regardless of what else is happening (good or bad).”

I could see it described as a “shifting rationale”, but I don’t think it matches the usual use of the term “mission creep”. Mainly because it doesn’t sound like they are changing the mission, they still are aiming at setting up a stable democracy in Iraq (the “success” they are talking about), and pointing out the consequences of failure.

Maybe it’s not mission creep, maybe it’s mission ’shrink.’ If one original goal was to establish a secure & democratic Iraq, THAT would have had a number of benefits. To now elevate an anti-mullah Mesopotamian Maginot Line (I’ve been pondering that bit of alliteration all morning) as the “core point” is quite a goal-shift. Read Stuntz’s (?) full quote. He talks about the “territory on which we fight.” No need for democracy, nor stability, nor a secular society, nor anything but an occupied trench line is needed to hold that core point.

As long as we are not driven from the field militarily, if we accomplish NOTHING else towards building a successful Iraqi society, we could still invoke the Stuntzian Line as a justificiation. That seems quite dangerous to me. Nor is this a “slippery slope;” Stuntz, Kristol & Lowry are doing it today. Iraq is a mess and they are saying, “But we gotta hold off the Mullahs! THAT’s the core point.”

We are fighting all three enemies in Iraq today…
…
Each of those groups loses big if a democratic regime is successfully established in Iraq. Baathist Syria will be less stable if Iraq is more so. A stable Iraq will show that Sunnis and Shiites can live together peacefully without a Sunni autocrat’s boot, a terrible message for Sunni jihadists. And Shiite jihadism loses the most of all. Iran, now the biggest danger to American interests in the region, is potentially our most valuable friend, because Iran’s population is more pro-American than any other Muslim people save the Kurds. A moderate Shiite-led democracy in Iraq would offer the Iranian people a picture of the alternative the mullahs and madmen who rule Tehran have denied them. That might mean the end of the current Iranian regime, in the not too distant future.

I would be concerned if they were trying to make the Maginot Line argument, but I see no reason to believe they are. They are working from the assumption that “success” in Iraq is and remains helping set up a stable democracy. And success in that original mission is what will imperil the mullahs in Iran.

I have to agree. How is it politically & diplomatically feasible to send it more troops when the administration has been regularly touting the progress made by Iraqi security forces?

Does the Iraqi government want more U.S. troops? If not, what is the U.S. supposed to tell them? Sorry guys, all that stuff about turning security over to you, well, we changed our mind.

It’s not just a question of U.S. political considerations. The administration has tied itself to a policy of Iraqi-izing the war. I can’t see it going back on that now and sending in more troops, barring some sort of dramatic development in Iraq.

And I disagree that sending more troops at this point is even a good idea. We are committed to building up Iraqi military and security forces. We can’t turn the clock back, scrap everything and start over. It’s not going to happen. I’ll be amazed to see major changes in our Iraq strategy before there’s a new administration in 2008.

By your logic, everything in WW2 that was not a direct assault on Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan would be considered “mission creep”.

Protecting a feldgling democracy from the influences and malicious intent of a neighboring Islamic Theocracy is EXACTLY the mission now.

There was a mission, to induce regime change, and that mission was accomplished. Now the mission is to allow that new regime to strenghten and grow to a point where it can defend itself from it’s enemies. Make no mistake that Iran has indeed labeled the new regime in Iraq as the enemy, and it is our duty, our responsibility and indeed our mission to protect the new Iraqi government from any who would try to roll it back to Saddam’s age or instill a Islamic Theocracy in the region.

I understand where you’re coming from, but this is not “mission creep”, it’s simply, the mission. That mission being, to protect the new Iraqi government from elements that would like to see it destroyed.

–Jason

We took out Iran’s archenemy, Saddam, in order to contain Iran?

Did these ninnies not see this coming when they agitated for war in the first place.

Then again, Lowry was talking about how we had defeated the insurgency a year ago, so he’ll be back with a 4th or 5th opinion in a few months.

Okay, the context of Stuntz’ piece does include the full argument. Maybe I should not read too much of K/L’s extract of it.

Bloodspite,

Your numbers look good to me. It would take a lot.

We took out Iran’s archenemy, Saddam, in order to contain Iran?

Did these ninnies not see this coming when they agitated for war in the first place.

Oh, so now Geek Esq is a fan of Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam! Will wonders never cease?!

Yes: the long term goal of creating a stable democratic Iraq will help contain things like the theocracy represented by Iran and the fascism in Syria. As Iran asserts its interest in this war, it directly works against this goal. Thus, a defeat for Iraqi democracy increases the power of the mullahs, given their status as regional superpower. This isn’t mission creep, it’s recognizing the downside of Iraqi disengagement, as well as putting this aspect of a failure within the context of the original goal.

The stakes are why it’s relevant for Rumsfeld et al to committ the force necessary, or stop arguing that it’s so important. The question is, can they?

Yes: the long term goal of creating a stable democratic Iraq will help contain things like the theocracy represented by Iran and the fascism in Syria.

Syria has never needed containing.

And, Saddam was a perfectly adequate bulwark against Iran.

So, we already effectively had Iran and Syria contained before the invasion of Iraq.

Then again, we also had the Taliban and AQ on the run in Afghanistan before we started the Iraq folly too.

Anyhoo, Bush needs a lot more troops for Afghanistan, al-Anbar, and Baghdad (and better make plans for a British withdrawal from southern Iraq ex post Tony Blair).

Where are these troops going to come from? And why does Don Rumsfeld still have a job?

If there’s one thing we know, it’s that Bush won’t make any major increase in troops until after the November elections.