Rumsfeld forbade Iraq post-war planning

General Scheid: Iraq post-war plan muzzled

Army Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, an early planner of the war, tells about challenges of invasion and rebuilding.

Months before the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld forbade military strategists from developing plans for securing a post-war Iraq, the retiring commander of the Army Transportation Corps said Thursday.

In fact, said Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, Rumsfeld said “he would fire the next person” who talked about the need for a post-war plan.

Scheid doesn’t go so far as calling for Rumsfeld to resign. He’s listened as other retired generals have done so.

“Everybody has a right to their opinion,” he said. “But what good did it do?”

Scheid’s comments are further confirmation of the version of events reported in “Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq,” the book by New York Times reporter Michael R. Gordon and retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor.

In 2001, Scheid was a colonel with the Central Command, the unit that oversees U.S. military operations in the Mideast. On Sept. 10, 2001, he was selected to be the chief of logistics war plans. On Sept. 11, 2001, he said, “life just went to hell.”

That day, Gen. Tommy Franks, the commander of Central Command, told his planners, including Scheid, to “get ready to go to war.”

A day or two later, Rumsfeld was “telling us we were going to war in Afghanistan and to start building the war plan. We were going to go fast.

“Then, just as we were barely into Afghanistan … Rumsfeld came and told us to get ready for Iraq.”

Planning continued to be a challenge.

“The secretary of defense continued to push on us … that everything we write in our plan has to be the idea that we are going to go in, we’re going to take out the regime, and then we’re going to leave,” Scheid said. “We won’t stay.”

Scheid said the planners continued to try “to write what was called Phase 4,” or the piece of the plan that included post-invasion operations like occupation.

Even if the troops didn’t stay, “at least we have to plan for it,” Scheid said.

I remember the secretary of defense saying that he would fire the next person that said that,” Scheid said. “We would not do planning for Phase 4 operations, which would require all those additional troops that people talk about today.

“He said we will not do that because the American public will not back us if they think we are going over there for a long war.”

Why did Rumsfeld think that? Scheid doesn’t know.

“But think back to those times. We had done Bosnia. We said we were going into Bosnia and stop the fighting and come right out. And we stayed.”

Was Rumsfeld right or wrong?

Scheid said he doesn’t know that either.

“In his own mind he thought we could go in and fight and take out the regime and come out. But a lot of us planners were having a real hard time with it because we were also thinking we can’t do this. Once you tear up a country you have to stay and rebuild it. It was very challenging.”

Even if the people who laid out the initial war plans had fleshed out post-invasion missions, the fighting and insurgent attacks going on today would have been hard to predict, Scheid said.

“We really thought that after the collapse of the regime we were going to do all these humanitarian type things,” he said. “We thought this would go pretty fast and we’d be able to get out of there. We really didn’t anticipate them to continue to fight the way they did or come back the way they are.

“Now we’re going more toward a civil war. We didn’t see that coming.”

While Scheid, a soldier since 1977, spoke candidly about the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq, he remains concerned about the American public’s view of the troops.

He’s bothered by the nationwide divide over the war and fearful that patriotism among citizens will continue to decline.

“We’re really hurting right now,” he said.

Trackbacks & Pings

  1. More links « Abstract Nonsense on 10 Sep 2006 at 3:56 am

    […] The Commissar quotes a General who says Rumsfeld explicitly forbade post-war planning in Iraq: [Link] Army Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, an early planner of the war, tells about challenges of invasion and rebuilding. […]

Comments

  1. Grim wrote:

    I tell you what. If that one is proven — that Rumsfeld forbade _planning_ for post-war Iraq — I’ll join you in calling for his ouster. And arrest.

  2. commissar wrote:

    Grim,

    From Cobra II and Fiasco, two themes about Rummy’s pre-war planning emerge. 1) Fewer troops, fewer troops, fewer troops. The military had an existing plan to invade Iraq, calling for 300,000 - 400,000 troops. Rumsfeld beat up Franks et al to do it with less. 2) We were not going to get bogged down in nation-building. Bush and Rummy viewed such efforts in Bosnia as a mistake. We were going to go into Iraq, take down Saddam, and get down. We DID have a plan. We explicitly planned to not get involved with nation-building.

    In that context, Scheid is the first that I have read to use the precise words quoted, “fire anyone who talked about Phase IV.” But it wholly fits.

  3. Grim wrote:

    Well, right. I’m familiar with the charge — which I think is true — that Rummy didn’t want to get bogged down with nation building. It’s doubtless true that he made several key mistakes in that regard. I was certain — so certain I blogged about it at the time — that we’d start seeing our major combat forces rotated out of Iraq, and replaced by military police and second-line units to keep the peace (while we moved on to Iran or Syria, I thought. Heh).

    Apparently, no plans for that were in place, which I found shocking and still find shocking. However, my understanding is that plans were made — two sets of them, in fact. The first was a DOD plan, and the second was a State plan, and the two bureaucracies fought over which one to execute to such a degree that neither actually got into the state of being ready for execution.

    That’s bad, and maybe even inexcusable — but it’s not Rummy’s fault, it’s Bush’s personal fault. Rummy is at fault for having guessed wrong, but guessing wrong in war isn’t a firing offense — it’s usual, even among the greatest generals, to make serious errors on occasion. That’s not unexpected in war, as the proper tactics and strategies do change from war to war (even though certain principles, e.g. friction, remain constant).

    If you can demonstrate that Rummy refused -to make plans at all-, though, that’s not just an error in judgment. That’s an offense that rises to the level of criminality.

    FWIW, although I am one of the more hawkish bloggers (I gather from Allah’s inclusion of me with Michael Yon and others in a recent blog post), I am persuadable on the evidence. I read TPD, and have since its inception, b/c it is a thoughtful site. So, while I do tend to take a line that is pro-military and pro-war, it’s because I think the evidence supports such a line (broadly, given that specific errors have been made, and that other mistakes will in the future be made). Show me the evidence, though, and like any good scientist’s, my mind can be changed.

  4. commissar wrote:

    Grim,

    There certainly was a turf war between State and Defense on responsibility for running postwar Iraq. Apparently, foreseeing a huge headache, State was glad to lose that battle. So, I’d distinguish between a turf war and planning.

    The planning (for post-war, so-called ‘Phase IV’) that was done focused on delivering humanitarian relief. Indeed that was roughly all we wanted to plan for. Beyond that, it was all hand-waving and PowerPoint slides. Who would do what to keep ministries running, work with the police, all those thousands of things needed to run a country — that just didn’t exist.

    But I must defer to Fiasco, Cobra II, and other books on the subject. The run-up to the war consumed 100+ pages in both books. I can’t really do justice to it in a comment thread. Personally, I’m satisfied with the evidence. BTW, I would love to read a counter-version, “The Neocon View of the Iraq War: why things went wrong and were the result of reasonable risk-taking and planning that did not pan out as well as hoped,” or some similar title. Seriously, I would love to read that.

    I don’t find it reasonable to exculpate either Bush or Rumsfeld in this matter. As to the constitutional threshhold for impeachment, as I read it, it has not been met.

    Like you, I have been a hawkish blogger, and have found some of my own posts from 2003 and 2004 incredibly revealing, and embarrassing.

  5. Bill from INDC wrote:

    Grim, Commissar:

    Hate to say it, but Assassin’s Gate backs up the charge. There was a cursory plan, but Rumsfeld et al explicitly told DoD planners to not bother with plans for civil admin, etc. after a successful ouster of Hussein.

    Truthfully, I have a hard time accepting this version of events uncritically, so I’m looking for an account that competes with this one, to compare. But it may be true. And if true, Rumsfeld is mad.