The Bridges at Nasiriyah

On March 23, 2003, the American invasion of Iraq was three days old and was moving along rapidly. From the top came pressure to push, push, push. Getting to Baghdad quickly was critical; “Speed kills,” General Tommy Franks said. Besides, Iraqi resistance was expected to be weak and the Shiites in the south might even welcome the overthrow of Saddam. Donald Rumsfeld’s “transformed” legions would see through the historic fog of war, and with 21st century information, communication, control, and weaponry slice through ancient Mesopotamia.

But on that day, 28 American soldiers and marines died around the bridges at Nasiriyah; many more were wounded; others were taken prisoner. They were Army reservists of the 507th Maintenance Company (including PFC Jessica Lynch) and Marines of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment. Wrong turns, broken equipment, friendly fire, mud, confusion, panic, and heroism marked that day.

The main American effort, the Army’s Third Infantry Division, was to move up along the left bank of the Euphrates. The Marines would cross the river at Nasiriyah, and then move north, towards the Tigris. Nasiriyah and other river crossings also had to be held to prevent Saddam’s forces from getting into our supply lines. (See large-scale map)
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In those first days and nights, the highways leading out of Kuwait and into Iraq were massive traffic jams, as thousands of American tanks, humvees, amphibious tracked vehicles, trucks, etc. squeezed onto them.

The ill-fated 507th Maintenance Company, charged with maintaining Patriot missile batteries, was in a hurry to get forward; the Patriot missiles were up front, ready to shoot down any incoming Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles. The 507th got split up. One group of 17 trucks, in an effort to make better time, left the highway, cutting across the open desert. It made for slow-going and exhausted the sleep-deprived soldiers. As the 17 vehicles approached Nasiriyah in the early morning of March 23, Captain King missed a turn. Instead of staying on the route headed west, following the Army units as planned, he inadvertently headed north, blowing by some Marines of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment (the “1/2″).

Now Captain King and his poorly trained reservists drove into Nasiriyah, a large city in a strategic place that the Iraqis had planned to defend. (See detailed map.) Roughly square, the city lay between the Euphrates River to the south and the Saddam Canal to the north. Two bridges crossed each waterway, one in each corner (NW, NE, SE, SW) of the rough square. Route 7 ran over the eastern bridges; these two bridges would figure prominently in the events of March 23 and were called the northen bridge and southern bridge. While the city of Nasiriyah, thus described, occupied a rough square, suburbs spread out across the waterways and highways noted. In particular, populous neighborhoods lay south of the Euphrates and also east of Highway 7. In their pre-war planning, the Marines ominously nicknamed the stretch of Highway 7 between the bridges “Ambush Alley.” It would be a prophetic term.

Heading north through the Iraqi-held city, the 33 soldiers of the 507th encountered no resistance at first. But after they crossed the northern bridge, into a military area, they began to take small-arms and RPG fire. Speeding up, they soon realized they had missed a turn. First Sergeant Dowdy, a professional soldier, advised Captain King of the error. The unit made a U-turn; some of the larger trucks and those with vehicles in tow couldn’t easily make the turn and lagged behind. (See map) Now speeding east and under increasing fire, Captain King missed the turn back south towards the bridges. The reservists were not well-trained, many of their weapons were sand-clogged; the 507th had no expectation of ever engaging in combat. Captain King soon realized the second missed turn, and ordered another U-turn. At this second U-turn, the big trucks struggled to get around in the narrow road, and fell further behind. Two trucks had to be abandoned at this spot. As more and more Iraqi RPGs and small-arms opened up, the 507th, by now widely stretched out, headed for the critical intersection for the third time.

Captain King and 2 other smaller trucks sped south on route 7 to safety. Five other trucks managed to get south of the bridges; ten soldiers huddled together and defended themselves as well as they could. From here they were later rescued by the Marines. Eight, mostly larger, vehicles lagged farther behind, and were all destroyed. Eleven of these soldiers were killed; six (including PFC Jessica Lynch) were captured. (The details of which soldiers were in which vehicles, and the fate of each are shown here. A map showing the second U-turn here.)

The Marines of 1/2 were south of the city as the 507th ran into trouble. Now one complication and confusion led to another. The First Battalion had a specific order of march and a plan for the day. In the lead was an attached company of tanks, commanded by Major Bill Peeples. While reservists too, these tankers were well-trained. Behind Peeple’s tanks came the infantry companies, in order: Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie.

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This picture shows the Marines approaching Nasiriyah, with smoke from burning vehicles of the 507th ahead.

The battalion was charged with taking the bridges - and fast! There had been some changes of plan and confusion at Marine Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT-2) headquarters during the night of March 22-23. As morning of the 23rd broke, Lt. Col. Ricky Grabowski, the commanding officer of 1/2, belatedly realized that he had to take the bridges, so that the overall Marine advance could continue unimpeded.

Captain King’s Humvee screeched into Peeples’ lines and the captain jumped out, took cover behind the door, and (obviously distraught) began screaming that he had people up there. Peeples couldn’t get much more out him, but sent forward a few tanks, which rescued the second group of the 507th, holding out by the railroad. More soldiers were still unaccounted for and smoke from their burning trucks could be seen up ahead. Peeples’ tanks went up, but found nothing; by this time, the Americans had been killed or captured. The tanks had consumed a lot of fuel and had to be sent back for refueling. The armored tip of the battalion spear was (for now) out of it.

A Huey helicopter carrying Brigadier General Natonski landed. In a hurried conference with Col. Bailey (CO of RCT-2) and Lt. Col. Grabowski, the importance of taking the bridges was re-emphasized. The possible presence of survivors from the 507th added to the urgency.

Grabowski launched his attack, according to his long-standing plan, except most of the tanks were unavailable. Alpha Company would cross and secure the southern bridge. Bravo Company would follow, and after crossing the Euphrates bridge, would swing east, to the outskirts of town, avoiding “Ambush Alley.” All the planning for the Iraq war emphasized avoiding urban battles. Wherever possible, Coalition forces would go around, not through, big cities. On the map, a swing to east, across more open ground, looked practical. Charlie Company was planned to follow Bravo, and when Bravo secured the approaches to the northern bridge, Charlie would cross and secure the far side. Thus Grabowski’s First Brigade would hold open the bridges of Nasiriyah for the other Marine units that were headed north.

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The Marines of 1/2 traveled and fought in Iraq from ungainly-looking vehicles called “tracks” or “amtracs.” Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) are tracked, lightly armored infantry carriers, which, despite their name, are quite well-suited to transporting Marines through a desert environment. They weigh 28 tons and carry three crew and seventeen Marines as passengers. From three hatches up front, the driver, the commander, and the gunner can see the road and battlefield. The gunner has a .50 caliber machine gun and a 40mm grenade launcher. The passenger Marines can disembark by dropping the rear ramp or through a door set into the ramp. Long covered hatches on top permit the Marines to stand and fire out, if appropriate. From this description, tracks sound pretty good, but “lightly armored” is the key phrase. They are not tanks and their armor only protects against small arms fire, not against RPGs or .50 caliber weapons. That day in Nasiriyah, the Marines of 1/2 rode in “tracks.”

When Captain Brooks’ Alpha Company crossed the southern bridge (over the Euphrates), it came under fire, and hunkered down at the north end of the bridge, more or less securing it. Captain Newland’s Bravo Company, along with a handful of tanks that had finishing re-fueling, rolled in behind, and moved off to the east, through side streets, looking for a more open route. But the maps had been deceiving. While the surface seemed dry, a few inches underneath was soft riverine mud. A nearby sewage plant contributed its foul liquid. In short order, Bravo Company’s tracks and tanks were literally “stuck in the shit.” They couldn’t go forward, and tank recovery vehicles got stuck themselves. The Bravo Marines then came under fire and had to operate defensively.

Captain Wittnam’s Charlie Company came up last, but found no trace of Bravo Company when they crossed the southern bridge. By this time, the communications of the Marines were hopelessly confused; in combat for the first time, the “comm” nets were jammed with all sorts of chatter. Some of the Marines’ radio equipment also malfunctioned. In after-action reports, one Marine after another reported, “I couldn’t get any comm.” The fog of war descended on the 1st Battalion with a vengeance.

It had also descended on the Iraqis. Earlier that morning, the Iraqi forces believed they had turned aside what they saw as an American attack - the truck-drivers and mechanics of the 507th. Now the Baathists, the Saddam fedayeen, and the regular army forces were both alerted and emboldened. They really had no idea what they had encountered when they struck the Grabowski’s Marines. Because in addition to Grabowski’s 500 well-armed, well-trained Marines in combat vehicles, the Marines could call down overwhelming artillery and air support.

As he crossed the southern bridge, Captain Wittnam made the critical decision to head straight up Ambush Alley for the northern span over the Saddam Canal. His orders were to take the bridges - quickly. He thought Bravo Company had taken the same route, according to a back-up plan. Riding in 11 tracks, Charlie Company pushed through Nasiriyah and came under very heavy fire. RPGs were flying at the column and AK-47 gunfire rattled out. The tracks’ gunners fired back furiously. The Marines in back fired M-16s and SAWs at the enemy. Charlie Company was now in front of the other companies. Since no one could “get any comm,” the guys of Bravo Company, stuck on the east side of town didn’t know that. They still thought they were in the lead.

As Charlie Company’s tracks neared the bridge, and the relatively open area on the far side, an RPG finally scored a direct damaging hit, blasting track C211, which still managed to get across the bridge. Four of the Marines inside were badly wounded. The other tracks pulled forward, spread out over a few hundred yards, some on one side of the road, some on the other. Track C211 soon caught fire and began cooking off its ammunition; a column of black smoke towered up.

Wittnam and his dismounted Marines were hit by RPGs, small arms, and machine guns. Iraqi mortar rounds began to bracket their position. It was horrifying; the Iraqis were not capitulating at all. They were fighting back, and Marines were dying. Wittnam’s men saw some of their buddies die terribly right there, mangled and burned bodies.

To the men involved the horrific combat seemed to go on forever. In fact, it occupied a few hours in the middle of the day. Charlie Company crossed the northen bridge just before noon (local time). A corpsman gave one of the wounded morphine and wrote on his forehead “M1327,” noting the time of the dose. (Click on the picture to see this on the wounded marine’s forehead.)

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More Marines were getting hit, there were badly wounded that needed attention, and dead bodies. Again, operating in confusion and with initiative, a sergeant decided to load up a track with casualties and head back. Four other tracks joined up. Captain Wittnam thought (or least said to his men) that they were beginning to win the battle. Certainly the company’s mortars were out-dueling the Iraqis. But, at this juncture, almost half of Wittnam’s company had left the battle.

Now the worst, most tragic incident of the day unfolded. Wittnam heard the distinctive sound of A-10s overhead and he thought that he would finally get some good air support. But the deadly Warthogs, firing thousands of rounds per minute, able to destroy armored vehicles, opened up right on the Marines, killing and wounding many more immediately. To the south, Bravo Company’s Forward Air Controller (FAC), confident that no Americans were in front of him had called in CAS (Close Air Support). He was taking fire. AS he spoke with the pilots, they reported armored vehicles up at the northern bridge. The FAC, call sign “MOUTH,” did his best, given the poor comm situation, to confirm that no Marines were north of the Saddam Canal. Believing that that to be the case, he told the A-10s to open up. The pillar of black smoke in their midst made a useful reference point for “MOUTH,” and the A-10 pilots. When they reported that some of the vehicles were heading his way across the bridge. “MOUTH” told them to stop those vehicles. Which they did.

As the five tracks from Charlie Company headed back, just as they got across, C208 was hit and blew up, killing most of the occupants. The A-10s continued their destructive rain of fire, along with the Iraqi RPGs. Two more tracks were hit, from whom remains uncertain. Eventually, the guys from Charlie Company got through the overcrowded comm nets, “Cease fire! Cease fire! Cease fire!” they screamed. Word finally reached the pilots and the A-10’s aborted their last run.

Several of the Marines from this group of tracks took refuge in a two-story house not far from the northern bridge, which they suitably called “The Alamo.” Here they held out for a few more hours.

17 Marines died at Nasiriyah. The official report mostly could not determine whether from enemy or friendly fire; the eyewitnesses indicated that the A-10’s killed most of them, especially in the inferno of track C208.

From this low point, things began to improve, and no more Marines were killed that day. The comm channels got straightened out and air support hit the Iraqis with increasing effectiveness. Alpha Company and parts of Bravo Company secured their positions and were able to get some supplies to the Marines holed up in the Alamo, and ultimately rescue them. A CH-46 pilot made a daring landing, in town, under fire, to med-evac some of the most badly wounded Marines. The refueled tanks were sent north to Wittnam’s relief. When they arrived he said that the noise of their engines was the most welcome sound he had ever heard. I can hardly imagine. That evening Marines from another battalion arrived to support the 1/2.

The bridges at Nasiriyah were secure.

The full story can be read in Marines in the Garden of Eden: The Battle for An Nasiriyah

Official report of A-10 Friendly Fire Investigation

Another short treatment at: Deadly Day for Charlie Company


Honor Roll, killed at An Nasiriyah, March 23, 2003

U.S. Marines, Charlie Co., 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment

Sergeant Michael Edward Bitz, 31, Ventura, California
Lance Corporal Brian Rory Buesing, 20, Cedar Key, Florida
Private 1st Class Tamario Demetrice Burkett, 21, Buffalo, New York
Corporal Kemaphoom “Ahn” Chanawongse, 22, Waterford, Connecticut
Lance Corporal Donald John Cline Jr., 21, Sparks, Nevada
Lance Corporal David Keith Fribley, 26, Lee, Florida
Corporal Jose Angel Garibay, 21, Orange, California
Private Jonathan Lee Gifford, 30, Macon, Illinois
Corporal Jorge Alonso Gonzalez, 20, Los Angeles, California
Private Nolen Ryan Hutchings, 19, Boiling Springs, South Carolina
Staff Sergeant Phillip Andrew Jordan, 42, Brazoria, Texas
Lance Corporal Patrick Ray Nixon, 21, Nashville, Tennessee
2nd Lieutenant Frederick Eben Pokorney Jr., 31, Nye, Nevada
Sergeant Brendon Curtis Reiss, 23, Casper, Wyoming
Corporal Randal Kent Rosacker, 21, San Diego, California
Lance Corporal Thomas Jonathan Slocum, 22, Adams, Colorado
Lance Corporal Michael Jason Williams, 31, Yuma, Arizona

U.S. Army, 507th Maintenance Company

Specialist Jamaal Rashard Addison, 22, Roswell, Georgia
Specialist Edward John Anguiano, 24, Brownsville, Texas*
Sergeant George Edward Buggs, 31, Barnwell, South Carolina*
Master Sergeant Robert John Dowdy, 38, Cleveland, Ohio
Private Ruben Estrella-Soto, 18, El Paso, Texas
Private 1st Class Howard Johnson II, 21, Mobile, Alabama
Specialist James Michael Kiehl, 22, Comfort, Texas
Chief Warrant Officer Johnny Villareal Mata, 35, Amarillo, Texas
Private 1st Class Lori Ann Piestewa, 23, Tuba City, Arizona
Private Brandon Ulysses Sloan, 19, Cleveland, Ohio
Sergeant Donald Ralph Walters, 33, Kansas City, Missouri

*3rd Forward Support Battalion, 3ID

Comments

  1. commissar wrote:

    I’ll make the first comment myself, since it really is a “comment,” unrelated to the story itself.

    I wrote this post today, from memory, without once looking back at “Marines in the Garden of Eden,” or other sources. There are a few minor details that I will double-check and clean up as needed.

    But I wonder what would happen if someone ran my post through a “plagiarism machine.” How many phrases or sentences would pop as being virtually identical to phrases in my sources? I don’t know, but it would be an interesting exercise.

    Oh yes, I DO hope to hear from John the Marine on this post, since he is not only a jarhead, but a track rat. :)

  2. John the Marine wrote:

    Commie, Lcpl “John the Marine” reporting as ordered.

    Hey, this story breaks my heart. It is a realization of all the fears I had when in Kuwait back in 91.

    The AAVP7A1 was the amtrac I drove. I’m sure after 12 years it has been upgraded, perhaps to A2 or A3. The up-gun weapons station has a M2 Browning .50 cal machine with an electric trigger and a Mark 19 automatic grenade launcher. The M2 can realistically fire about 200 rounds/minute. Two factors limit it. 1) The obvious is amunition. You don’t want to piss through your rounds. 2) If you over do it the barrel will heat up red hot and then will have to either be allowed to cool (which you might not have time for) or be switched out with another. Under fire this is no easy task. The gunner has to get out of the turrent for several minutes and once back inside he’ll have to reset the head space and timing. The Mark 19 is an indirect fire weapon. It lobs its rounds and therefore is a “cool” fire system. As long as you feed it, it will fire nicely. It is extremely effective against enemy infantry and emplacements with a 5 meter kill radius and 15 meter wound or kill radius. One down side of the up-gun weapon station is that it is manual traverse (hand crank to turn the turrent). Doctrine (when I was in) was that tracs and infantry support and protect the tanks from shoulder fire ambush by enemy grunts. The tanks support the infantry and tracs by providing long range fire with their 105 mm gun against enemy tanks, artillery and emplacements. Also, tanks are impervious to RPG, small arms and even 12.7 mm (Soviet bloc .50 cal) weapons making them down right deadly to enemy vehicles and infantry. This combined with close air support (first used by the USMC) is a viscious combination.

    Reading above it seems once communication became a problem control of the battle field was lost. The three companies became blind and the Air Force A 10’s then became misinformed about Marine movement and opened up on their own guys with out realising it. An A 10 is a trac rat and tanker’s nightmare. No, amored vehicle can withstand its .30 cal uranium depleted rounds and high rate of fire. When it hit C208 there was probably very little left of that trac in a matter of less than a second. Anyone inside who lived through the attack was truely lucky in the extreme, the odds are like winning the lottery.

    The positive side of this story is; all considered the causalties could have been much higher. Marine training and determination saved the day and yes, won the battle.

    When I was in Desert Storm it was a one sided slaughter. I think Americans expected a repeat of that performance which was and is unrealistic. Also, I think Rummy underestimated the task at hand and the amount of resources needed. This is the face of war in all its horror and confusion. Reading the above post literally made me tear up. I saw a documentry about the above events a few months ago that drove into such a rage that my wife made me turn off the TV after which she soothed me back to Coopersburg PA. I have not been to Iraq. My fighting days are over but I do feel an emotional attachment that only a Marine can feel for his brothers in arms. the only way I can describe it is that it is a 1,000,000 times stronger then any bond in the world save maybe for your children or mother.

    excellent post Commie. I can’t say I enjoyed but it makes me even more proud of my fellow Marines and our Corps.

  3. commissar wrote:

    JTM,

    One of the Marines in Charlie Company knew all about A-10s. He had been strafed by them during Desert Storm, too. :(

  4. John the Marine wrote:

    Commie,
    I saw what they, A-10’s, left behind in Kuwait. A T-80 Soviet main battle tank didn’t stand a snowball’s chance in Hell. Just a pile of burning debree and ammo cooking off was all that was left. Also, A-10’s have very heavy amor on the under side. Heavy machine gun and small arms fire will just make the pilot angry. About the only thing ground forces can use against them is a stinger missle or an equivalent. The A-10’s weakness being that for a fixed wing aircraft they move slow, about 600 mph. They don’t have the speed to out run the stinger type ground to air missles. The A-10 was something the Irqis feared most. The way they put it was the sound of warthog’s approach ment with out a doubt that you were going to die if you stayed in the vehicle.

  5. commissar wrote:

    John,

    On the M2, how much could you fire, if you wanted to keep it up indefinitely? I mean, without overheating it. A 3-second burst every 30 seconds? More than that?

    This may be silly, but could you pour water on the barrel? Maybe if you had 100 gallons handy, eh? :) Or would such a sudden cooling effect warp the metal of the barrel?

  6. John the Marine wrote:

    It isn’t a silly question at all. You could fire a 6 to 12 round burst every 3 to 6 seconds and still be very safe. The barrels of a M2 weigh about 17 lbs. If it was available you could pour water on it to bring the temp down or even piss on it. However, the problem is not the barrel strength but exposing yourself in a fight. You don’t want to be on the outside of the vehicle when you’re being shot at.

    Also, keep in mind a .50 cal round does a lot of damage. I have a Toyota Corolla. If you opened up on my car with an M2 it would be torn into peices. If a person was hit in the mid section with a .50 cal round they would be split in two. It doesn’t take a whole lot of .50 cal fire to make your point. You can shoot through; walls, up to 1 in. of homogeneous steel or crack a truck’s engine block to give some examples of its destructive power.

    Finally, the ammo container in AVVP7A1 holds about 450 rounds in connected belts. To maintain a high rate of fire you would need someone in the troop compartment below the weapons station adding belts together for you. 100 round belts sound like a lot of ammo but believe me you could grease through them real quick if you’re not paying attention. The USMC is big on fire disipline for good reason.

    This is where the M-85 .50 cal machine gun comes in. The M-85 was designed for tanks and amored vehicles, unlike the M2 which is a dual use weapon (quick note - the M2 has been around since pre-WWII, old man Browning would be proud). It has a much higher rate of fire than the M2 and its barrels have pre-set head space/timing and weigh about half as much. The gunner equiped with an asbestos glove can switch barrels in about 15 - 30 seconds without getting out of the trac. When I was in Saudi my trac had an electric weapons station (the name of the M-85 equiped weapons system for AAVP7A1) as opposed to an up-gun. You didn’t have the Mark 19 but let me tell you that M-85 was a ruthless *****. She would tear up an enemy position in a heartbeat.

    Personally I loved live fire exercises. You would go out to the .50 cal range on Camp Pendleton and shoot at derelict vehicles (LTVP5’s or 5 ton trucks). Ah, the good times… I do miss the hardware!

  7. John wrote:

    That Bravo Co FAC had no business calling in CAS when comms were that f’ed up.

  8. commissar wrote:

    On the Bravo Co FAC — Officially, he took the blame for the incident. While he “had comm” with his air units, he did violate a rule, a procedure that had been set down. According to the procedures in place, he was only authorized to call in air strikes on targets he could see himself. The official report on the A-10 Friendly Fire incident covers this specific point in great detail.

    To his credit, “MOUTH” reported himself as soon as he realized that there may have been a problem.

  9. Richard S. Lowry wrote:

    Commissar,

    Great job from memory. You are correct that you made a few minor errors like Bravo Company went over the bridge first. All-in-all you did a great job from memory.

    As for the plagiarism issue: If you happened to duplicate anything in the book, I don’t mind. I am just thrilled that you took the time to mention my book and tell this story to others.

    Regards,
    Richard S. Lowry
    Author
    “Marines in the Garden of Eden.”

  10. Gy C wrote:

    great article…just one detail to add for now. 18 Marines were killed that day. Lance Cpl. Thomas A. Blair, 24, of Broken Arrow, Okla., was attached to Charlie Company from 2nd LAAD. Could you add him to the honor roll. As far as “Mouth”, I was on the recieving end. He did what he had to with the information he was given. There was a lot of facts stricken or left out of the investigation.(read it and you’ll see) Just as America needed a war hero with Jessica( who never fired a round), they needed someone to blame for these Marines’ deaths. I’d serve with him anyday. Thanks for telling our story and allowing the memory of 18 REAL heros to live on.