Clausewitz v. Rumsfeld

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking.” - On War, by Karl von Clausewitz

June 27, 2003 - Rumsfeld Wouldn’t Call It ‘Guerilla Warfare’ in Iraq

December 15, 2005 - We’ve kind of migrated over the last four years … where we’re trying to move away from looking at size, numbers of things, and mass, and look more at agility and speed and the capability that can be delivered.

August 25, 2006 - Rumsfeld rejects reports that Iraq is moving towards a civil war.

While more subtle than the other two comments, the December, 2005 remark at a Pentagon town hall meeting reveals Rumsfeld’s “strategic” thinking. The question was not about Iraq, but that’s what Rumsfeld values: speed and smart bombs. He should read this, the Army and Marine Corps draft field manual on counter-insurgency, written by Generals Mattis and Petraeus.

Update: Chapomatic’s trackbacked post would imply that Rumsfeld does understand what kind of war we’re in. Draw your own conclusions.

Trackbacks & Pings

  1. Chapomatic » Valuable In Depth Analysis on 27 Aug 2006 at 2:40 pm

    […] Is this what passes for thoughtful critique these days? […]

Comments

  1. frontinus wrote:

    Holy cow. Who wrote this?

    Posted 27 Aug 2006 at 10:25 pm

  2. Grim wrote:

    As to judging the matter, I judge it impossible that Rumsfeld has not read the draft Counterinsurgency manual mentioned. It was not without Rumsfeld’s consent that Mattis — most famous in this war for his comments on the joys of killing the enemy — was raised in rank and given command of the I MEF, one of the premier warfighting instruments ever devised by mankind.

    Nor was it without Rumsfeld’s input that Mattis was assigned so important a task as the revising of the Counterinsurgency doctrine.

    Mattis is the best general we have in this war. That he has been so recognized speaks well of those in final command. Whatever other errors they may have made, in this matter they have judged well and wisely.

    Posted 27 Aug 2006 at 10:55 pm

  3. commissar wrote:

    On page 1-24 of the Counterinsurgency Manual is a table of Unsuccesful and Successful Practices. If you want to adopt the “criticism = betrayal” posture, that’s fine. But if you look at those two lists and take an objective view of how we have proceeded in Iraq, the rating is very clear.

    Grim, I will give Rummy credit for promoting Mattis. If he has read the COIN manual, I have seen zero evidence that he has acted on it, and (as the post tersely notes) there is ample evidence that Rummy continues to be in denial.

    Posted 27 Aug 2006 at 11:08 pm

  4. Grim wrote:

    There are two points that ought to be clarified, as re: the 25 August quote. Point one is that the British agree, as explained by Royal Marine General Robert Fry:

    The reasons are technical, but it isn’t a purely semantic difference. Military science treats civil wars differently from counterinsurgencies. A general who insists that we’re fighting one and not the other isn’t playing with words; he’s explaining the strategy. If you look at the technical reasons offered, you can see how a change in those conditions would require a different strategy.

    Second, Rumsfeld’s 25 August quote came after a meeting with the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister in charge of security. The DPM had just said the same thing to the press — there is no danger of civil war.

    Did you want Rumsfeld to countermand his host? Even if he disagreed privately, should he undermine that man’s credibility, when we are trying to help the Iraqi central government establish its authority?

    Rumsfeld is a high enough official that he has political as well as military duties. Politics requires diplomacy, which is to say deceit. You can’t rely on public officials’ diplomatic comments to be 100% truthful or accurate — I’ve sat and listened to diplomats lie through their teeth, about topics the truth of which were plainly established ten minutes earlier by a panel of military and civilian experts.

    Unfortunately, anyone in Rumsfeld’s shoes would have had to have said the same thing. Whether or not it’s accurate, it was the only thing he could say under the circumstances.

    Of course, on the British general’s terms, it was an accurate statement. The question is whether or not the government is “heading” toward civil war, as they keep asking. Is there evidence that the central government is collapsing? I don’t think so — I think the Sunni insurgency is largely a vehicle for people who are negotiating a place in the central government, and think they can benefit from bombs as well as talk. Which, in fact, they can.

    When the Iraqi Army is ready to turn to the pacification of al Anbar, however, the point will have arrived at which it is time to cut a deal. After Baghdad is stabilized and cleansed of militias — pity about the militias, for which I had some hope in the early days, when they were defending the populace instead of acting as death squads or kidnap gangs — the Iraqi Army will be ready to look to the pacification of al Anbar.

    I don’t think the US military will be involved to a great degree — air support, probably — because we won’t want to be involved. It is not likely to be done under US rules, and so we shall want some plausible deniability. It is their country, after all, and so ‘of course we wouldn’t want to meddle in internal affairs.’ Some phrase like that — laughably diplomatic — will cover us.

    It shouldn’t take long, at that point, before the majority of the Sunni tribes cut the deal they are trying to cut, on the best terms that will be available for a long while. That should diminish the insurgency enough to ensure the stability of the government, and permit us to mostly, or wholly, withdraw from Iraq.

    Posted 28 Aug 2006 at 10:45 am

  5. commissar wrote:

    Grim,

    I understand and agree fully with the notion that senior officials, with diplomatic responsibilities, can and cannot say certain things. I’d be more inclined to give Rumsfeld a pass on this, as you suggest, if the historical record didn’t show that his actions to-date have been grounded in denials of reality, which apparently run much deeper than public, diplomatic utterances.

    I.e. He really really really (privately, publicly, in deed and in word) directed the military occupation as if there was no guerrilla war, no insurgency, but only a few “dead-enders.”

    His Dec. 2005 comments suggests that he still believes his “transformation … less is more” concepts are the solution, not the problem.

    As for your last three paragraphs of optimism(?), I pray you are right, but the record so far suggests a more dismal outlook.

    Posted 28 Aug 2006 at 11:29 am

  6. Grim wrote:

    Well, a great deal turns on the performance of the Iraqi army. If they can pacify the militias, they will turn to Anbar with a reputation that will ease the problem. If not, not.

    Still, I’ve heard a great deal of good about these young Iraqi Army men from Marines, for several years now. They’ll suffer losses in the next few weeks outsized compared to what we would suffer doing the same thing, but I think they will prevail. That’s the good news — they are indeed ’standing up’ and taking the fight to the foe.

    Posted 28 Aug 2006 at 9:23 pm

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