Phaedo 77

(from Phaedo 76)
καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος
and the argument reaches/arrives at the excellent (conclusion)

εἰς
--------------------------------

[77α] τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν
similarly exist both the soul of us

(an odd use of the singular, both here and in 76: "the soul (singular) of ours." In English, "our souls" would seem to be a smoother translation, unless Plato did mean some single entity, i.e. "the collective soul (a singular entity) of us all." I don't think that's what's meant, though.)

πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς
before our birth

καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις.
as well as the essence of which you now speak.

οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὂν ὡς τοῦτο,
For I at least have nothing so clear to me as this,

τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα,
all such things have a real existence,

καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες:
the beautiful and the good and all the other things which you just now spoke:

καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.
and it seems to me sufficiently shown."

τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης: δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν.
"How about Kebes?" said Socrates, "for Kebes must also be persuaded."

ἱκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι:
"Sufficiently," said Simmias, "as I think:"

καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις.
Indeed he is the most obstinate of men, in his disbelief of these arguments.

ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν,
But I think there is not (much) lacking to persuade him,

ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι [77β] ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή:
that before birth our soul existed:

εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται,
However, that it still exists after we die,

οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδεῖχθαι,
I do not think, Socrates," he said, "this has been proven,

ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν ὃ νυνδὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε,


τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἅμα ἀποθνῄσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ᾖ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ συνίστασθαι ἄλλοθέν ποθεν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; [77ξ]

εὖ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἥμισυ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὗ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή, δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἕξειν.

ἀποδέδεικται μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ 'θέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταὐτὸν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὡμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν μὲν [77δ] ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένῃ μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε δεῖ αὖθις αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν. ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ [77ε] καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνῄσκων.

καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν: μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.

ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε.

Phaedo 76

[76α]

Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη,
For this is possible it appears,

αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν
perceiving something, either seeing or hearing or some other sense

λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὃ ἐπελέληστο,
acquiring another thing than this to consider, which had been forgotten,

ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὂν ἢ ᾧ ὅμοιον:
by which this was associated, being unlike or like it:

ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω,
so that, as I was saying,

δυοῖν θάτερα,
one of two things (is the case),

ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες,
either everyone knows this when born and we know it throughout our lives,

ἢ ὕστερον, οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν,
or later, that which we call learning,

οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀναμιμνῄσκονται οὗτοι,
is nothing other than those recollecting,

καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη.
and learning would be remembering.

Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
"That is certainly true, Socrates."

Πότερον οὖν αἱρῇ, ὦ Σιμμία;
"Which do you choose, Simmias? ---

ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι,
(We) were born with the knowledge,

[76β] ἢ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι ὕστερον ὧν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἦμεν;
or (we) remembered later that knowledge we had acquired before (our birth)?"

Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἑλέσθαι.
"I cannot choose at this time, Socrates."

τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἑλέσθαι,
"Well then, you can choose this,

καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ;
What do you think about this? ---

ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὔ;
A man knowing, would be able to give an account about that which he knows, or not?"

πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
"Most certainly, Socrates," he said.

ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νυν δὴ ἐλέγομεν;
"Does is also seem to you that everyone can give an account about these things which just now we talking?"

βουλοίμην μεντ' ἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας:
"Indeed I wish," said Simmias,

ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε
"but very much I fear that tomorrow at this time

οὐκέτι ᾖ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἷός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. [76ξ]
there will be no one among men properly able to do this."

Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά;
"Then you do not think that everybody knows these things, Simmias?"

Οὐδαμῶς.
"By no means."

'Αναμιμνῄσκονται ἄρα ἅ ποτε ἔμαθον;
"Then they recollect what they once learned?"

'Ανάγκη.
"Necessarily."

Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ᾽ οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν.
"When did our souls acquire the knowledge of these things? For it was not after we men were born."

Οὐ δῆτα.
"Of course not."

Πρότερον ἄρα.
"Then earlier."

Ναί.
"Yes."

'Ησαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον,
"Then, Simmias, our souls existed previously,

πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει,
before they were in human form,

χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον.
apart from bodies, and having intelligence."

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν,
"Unless at the same time as being born, we acquired,

ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας: οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος. [76δ]
Socrates, this knowledge: for that time still remains." (unclear?)

Εἶεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε:
"Well, my good friend,

ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ;
at what other time do we lose them?"

—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα,
- For not having them when we were born,

ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν—
as we just agreed ---

ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν;
do we lose then at the (same) time in which we acquired them?

ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον;
or do you have some other time to say/suggest?"

Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.
"By no means, Socrates. But I forgot myself speaking nothing/nonsense.

'Αρ᾽ οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία;
"Then, is this how it is for us, Simmias?

εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί,
If what we have always said is so,

καλόν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία,
the beautiful and the good and all such essences (exists),

καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν,
and to/upon these we refer everything from our senses,

[76ε] ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν,
which we find existed previously and are now ours,

καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν,
and we compare our sensations with these,

ἀναγκαῖον,
is it not necessary that

οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν,
just as these (essences/abstractions) exist,

οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς:
thus also our souls exist, even before we were born?

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα,
But if these do not exist,

ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη;
otherwise might this argument be of no force?

ἆρ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει,
But is this so, ---

καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι,
is it equally certain that both these (essences) and our souls existed before we were born,

καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε;
and if not those (essences), then not the souls?

'Υπερφυῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας,
"Absolutely, Socrates," said Simmias,

δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι,
"I think it is the same necessity,

καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος
and the argument reaches/arrives at the excellent (conclusion)

εἰς ... (see Phaedo 77)